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Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate
criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they
spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe,
1
because foreign nations decriminalize conduct.
Louis Henkin has observed that the international human
rights movement has always been understood by the Unites States
as a means for protecting human rights in countries other than the
2
United States. This conception may contribute to the reluctance
of U.S. courts to embrace the standards of international human
rights law. However, the configuration of legal and political
considerations that underlie this reluctance is far more complex.
This Article examines this reluctance and its foundations in the
context of a particular issue—whether individuals have a right to
engage in same-sex sexual conduct.

† Director of the Center for International Law and Policy at the New
England School of Law.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 74 (1990).
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LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
3
Texas statute that criminalized same-sex sexual conduct. The two
petitioners in Lawrence, both male, had been arrested and
convicted under this statute for engaging in a private, consensual
4
sexual act. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that the
petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
5
of the government.” In striking down this statute the Court
6
overruled its prior holding in Bowers v. Hardwick that same-sex
7
sexual conduct was not encompassed by this liberty.
In the course of the opinion, Justice Kennedy referred twice to
8
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and
made reference generally to the national practice of foreign
countries concerning “the right of homosexual adults to engage in
9
intimate, consensual conduct.” Reference to the ECHR judgments
could have been employed for a number of different purposes.
The Court could have turned to the jurisprudence of the ECHR to
seek guidance in interpreting the international obligations of the
10
United States. It could also have referred to these cases in the
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
4. Id. at 563.
5. Id. at 578.
6. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
8. Id. at 573, 576. The ECHR was created by the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as
amended by Protocol 11, Europ. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights].
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. “Other nations, too, have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.
There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.” Id.
(citation omitted).
10. While the United States are not a party to the European Convention on
Human Rights, they are a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which closely parallels the European Convention. The provisions
in each treaty setting forth right to privacy in particular are very similar. Compare
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”), with European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to
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context of a comparative law analysis for the purpose of
interpreting analogous rights protected under U.S. constitutional
law, such as the right to privacy or equal protection of the law.
Instead, the Court referred to the ECHR’s jurisprudence in the
most timid, innocuous way—merely for the proposition that to the
extent the Bowers Court relied on values shared with a wider
civilization, “it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in
11
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”
Notwithstanding the mildness with which the Court invoked
the practice of the European court, Justice Scalia responded in his
dissent with the strong rebuke appearing at the outset of this
article: “Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal
sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring into
existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations
12
decriminalize conduct.”
He opined that the Bowers Court had
“never relied on ‘values we share with a wider civilization,’” and that
the Court’s discussion of these “foreign views” was “therefore
13
meaningless dicta.” And not only meaningless, but “[d]angerous
dicta . . . since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods,
14
fads, or fashions on Americans.’”
It seems that Justice Scalia was correct, at least regarding the
assertion that the Court’s references were made obiter. But was
there an alternative? Could the Court have invoked international
legal standards in a robust manner? One can only imagine how
much more blistering a rebuke it would have received if the
majority had acknowledged the legal force of norms generated
beyond the four corners of the U.S. Constitution.
The following sections will examine whether there is any
international obligation binding on the United States that would
have been relevant to this case, and whether that international
norm could have been applied by the Court.

respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”).
11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. “To the extent Bowers [v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)] relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The
European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom[, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981)].” Id.
12. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari)).
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATION ON
THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. Context
Until very recently, no legal protection on the basis of sexual
orientation could be found at the international level. Although the
horrors of World War II gave rise to significant advances in the
protection of individuals under international law, such protection
did not extend to homosexuals.
Notwithstanding the mass
execution of homosexuals during World War II, there is virtually
no mention of this victim group in the judgment of the
15
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Nor did this group
find protection in the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an instrument drafted
on the heels of World War II and designed to protect groups from
16
discriminatory annihilation. The continuing lack of protection
for homosexuals as a group likely flowed, at least in part, from the
belief that homosexuality is not intrinsic or fundamental to one’s
identity, but that it is simply a matter of aberrant behavior which
could be justifiably repressed.
While international criminal law evolved little during the Cold
War, it gained renewed vigor following the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR) in the mid-1990s. Despite the great strides in
jurisprudence these institutions made, such developments did little
to advance the legal protection of homosexuals. The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), adopted in 1998, and in
many ways reflecting the culmination of international
17
developments, fails to make any reference to sexual orientation.
Indeed, the term “gender,” included as one of the grounds for the
crime of persecution, is expressly defined as “the two sexes, male
18
and female, within the context of society.”
The definition
continues, “[t]he term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning
different from the above,” in an apparent attempt to prevent the
15. See United States v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946) (The Nuremberg Trial).
16. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
17. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
18. Id. art. 7, para. 3.
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interpretation of gender from including sexual orientation.
Although the definition of persecution includes the residual phrase
“or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
20
under international law,” the use of “universal” could prevent the
ICC from interpreting this phrase to include sexual orientation
given the lack of consensus noted above.
Similarly, international human rights law has been slow to
afford protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The nondiscrimination provisions of the major
human rights treaties make no mention of sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, advances have been made through the jurisprudence
of international human rights mechanisms.
The earliest
developments were related to decriminalization of same-sex sexual
conduct and were grounded in the right to privacy.
21
In Toonen v. Australia, the Human Rights Committee, the
treaty body charged with monitoring implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
found that the criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct
constituted a violation of the complainant’s right to privacy under
22
Article 17 of the Covenant. However, in that case, the Australian
government also expressly sought the Committee’s guidance as to
whether sexual orientation was a prohibited basis for
23
discrimination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Covenant.
The Committee confined itself to noting that in its view “the
reference to ‘sex’ in [the nondiscrimination provisions of the
24
Covenant] is to be taken as including sexual orientation.” While
this did not form part of the Committee’s ratio decidendi in Toonen,
its reference to and interpretation of the nondiscrimination
provision marked a significant turning point in the protection of
homosexual rights at the international level.
Over time, the conceptual framework employed by human
rights mechanisms shifted from one grounded in privacy to one
based on nondiscrimination, which enabled the extension of this
protection into the public sphere. For example, in Young v.

19. Id.
20. Id. art. 7, para. 1(h).
21. Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994),
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm.
22. Id. ¶¶ 8.2-9.
23. Id. ¶ 6.9.
24. Id. ¶ 8.7.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 3
03CERONE.DOC

1/14/2006 6:25:06 PM

548

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

25

Australia, the Committee held that differentiation in awarding
pension rights between opposite-sex and same-sex couples
amounted to unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of the
complainant’s sex or sexual orientation and thus constituted a
26
violation of Article 26 of the Covenant.
Similar advances have been made among regional human
27
28
rights mechanisms, particularly in Europe. In Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, one of the ECHR cases cited by the Lawrence Court, the
ECHR found that the existence of a law criminalizing same-sex
sexual conduct violated the applicant’s right to privacy under
29
Article 8 of the European Convention. Although the applicant
had alleged that this statute also constituted a violation of Article
14 of the Convention, which provides for non-discrimination in the
enjoyment of convention rights, the court found it unnecessary to
30
reach this question in light of the clear violation of Article 8. The
court noted that
[w]here a substantive Article of the Convention has been
invoked both on its own and together with Article 14 and
a separate breach has been found of the substantive
Article, it is not generally necessary for the Court also to
examine the case under Article 14, though the position is
otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the
enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental aspect
25. Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (click on “Search the Database”
and enter the document number).
26. Id. ¶ 10.4. It should be noted, however, that this case was decided after
Lawrence v. Texas.
27. As noted above, one of the ways in which the Supreme Court could have
invoked the ECHR’s case law more robustly would have been to use it as guidance
in interpreting similar international obligations binding on the United States. See
supra Part I. Given the pervasive phenomenon of cross-fertilization among
international fora, particularly among human rights fora, it is not uncommon to
cite jurisprudence from regional fora as precedent for universal regimes.
Regional practice is also particularly useful since the regional institutions, the
combined membership of which comprises a large proportion of U.N. member
states, tend to be more active, and thus have broader bases of experience within
their spheres of competence.
28. Even within the European human rights system, though, the scope of
protection from discrimination remains limited. The ECHR ultimately found that
France’s refusal to authorize the adoption of a child by a single gay man, a
decision “based decisively on the latter’s avowed homosexuality,” was not
discriminatory in view of Article 14 of the Convention. Fretté v. France, 38 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 21, ¶ 43 (2002).
29. 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981).
30. Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
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31

of the case.
In later cases, the European Court of Human Rights shifted its
focus to Article 14. In L. and V. v. Austria, the applicants alleged
“that the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Austrian
Criminal Code, which penalised homosexual acts of adult men with
consenting adolescents between 14 and 18 years of age, and their
convictions under that provision violated their right to respect for
32
their private life and were discriminatory.” The court held that
this law violated Article 14 of the Convention, and thus found it
unnecessary “to rule on the question whether there had been a
33
violation of Article 8 taken alone.”
In any event, whether grounded in the right to privacy or nondiscrimination, it was clear long before Lawrence was decided that
international human rights law, and the ICCPR in particular,
prohibited criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, at least
between consenting adults in the privacy of their home.
B. Relevant Obligations of the United States
The United States, having signed and ratified the ICCPR,
became bound by its provisions when that treaty entered into force
34
for the United States on June 8, 1992. In the Toonen case, the
Human Rights Committee clearly established its view that the mere
existence of domestic laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct
35
constituted a violation of the ICCPR.
The following year the
31. Id. ¶ 67.
32. L. and V. v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (2003).
33. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. While the nature of the applicants’ claims could provide an
independent basis for the inversion of prioritization as between articles eight and
fourteen, it cannot be doubted that the changing social and political climate made
it easier for the court to switch from the framework of privacy to that of nondiscrimination.
34. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATY FRAMEWORK: AN INVITATION TO
UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION FOCUS 2005: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 9-10
(2005).
35. Mr. Toonen had not been prosecuted—the mere fact that the law was in
force constituted a violation. See Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992,
¶
8.2
(1994),
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm (“In so far as article
17 is concerned, it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is
covered by the concept of ‘privacy’, and that Mr. Toonen is actually and currently
affected by the continued existence of the Tasmanian laws. The Committee
considers that sections 122 (a) and (c) and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code
‘interfere’ with the author’s privacy, even if these provisions have not been
enforced for a decade.”).
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Committee included among its “principal subjects of concern” in
relation to U.S. compliance with the ICCPR, “the serious
infringement of private life in some states which classify as a
criminal offence sexual relations between adult consenting
partners of the same sex carried out in private, and the
consequences thereof for their enjoyment of other human rights
36
without discrimination.”
While the Committee is not strictly speaking a judicial body,
and its views are not technically binding, its interpretation of the
37
Covenant is generally recognized as authoritative. Thus, there is
at least a strong argument that the criminal prosecution at issue in
the Lawrence case was incompatible with the international
38
obligations of the United States under the ICCPR.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Lawrence made no
reference to any international norm binding the United States. To
understand why, consideration must be given to the disposition of
36. This concern was stated in the context of its Concluding Observations
rendered in response to the Initial Report of the United States detailing its
compliance with the Covenant, submitted under Article 40 of the Covenant.
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, A/50/40, ¶ 287 (1995).
37. While the United States have filed a declaration recognizing the Article
41 competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive complaints from other
States Parties, see 138 CONG. REC. 6, 8071 (1992), they have not become a party to
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, UNITED NATIONS, supra note 34, at 13,
and thus does not recognize the competence of the Committee to receive
complaints from individuals alleging violations of the Covenant. See Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302 (explaining that the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
establishes the competence of the Committee to receive communications from
individuals claiming to be victims of violations of the Covenant). Nonetheless, the
United States are a party to the ICCPR, the Committee’s constitutive instrument,
which implicitly recognizes the authority of the Committee to interpret the
Covenant. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 34, at 9-10. The Committee’s authority to
interpret the Covenant is also widely supported in the practice of the Committee
as well as among the state parties to the ICCPR.
38. It could also be argued that there is an emerging norm of customary
international law providing some protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. However, such an argument would be unlikely to prevail given
the wide disparities in state practice. The legal position of homosexuals varies
significantly from country to country—from constitutionally entrenched freedom
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to laws that make
homosexual acts punishable by death. Even among countries where all individuals
are guaranteed a standard of humane treatment, controversies remain over
whether homosexuals should be protected as such. One example is the
continuing debate in the United States over hate crimes legislation and the
inclusion of sexual orientation as a ground for that kind of criminal charge.
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the United States toward the reception of international law within
the municipal (i.e. domestic) sphere.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND U.S. LAW
International law generally does not dictate how international
obligations are to be implemented within the domestic sphere. In
the absence of a specific obligation to alter some facet of a state’s
39
internal legal framework, it is usually up to each state to
determine how to give effect to its international obligations. That
being the case, there is no established international legal standard
governing how international law is to be received in the municipal
sphere. As a result, there is a great variety among states in the
degree of penetration of international law into the domestic legal
system.
That great variety of configurations falls along a spectrum
from monism to dualism. A monist state would be one that
envisions international law as part of the domestic legal order. In
essence, there is but one legal system into which international law
flows freely.
In contrast, dualist states would regard the
international and municipal legal systems as two discreet spheres,
such that international law cannot penetrate into the municipal
sphere in the absence of some act of the relevant national
authorities expressly transforming those norms into domestic law.
In monist systems, international law is generally accorded a
normative status hierarchically superior to that of statutory
40
domestic law. In a dualist system, once transformed into domestic
law, the formerly international norms would have the same status as
other domestic laws.
The U.S. legal system appears prima facie to be more monist
than dualist. The Constitution declares that treaties made under
the authority of the United States, together with the Constitution
41
and federal law, “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” The
39. For example, some treaties expressly require states to enact domestic
legislation criminalizing certain conduct. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5, Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
40. See, e.g., GW. ch. 5, § 2, art. 94 (Neth.). This article of Netherlands’
Constitution accords treaty rules a higher status than domestic legislation. Thus,
courts may exercise judicial review of Dutch legislation by testing it against
Netherlands’ treaty obligations.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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U.S. legal system appears equally amenable to customary
international law. As the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana
case famously proclaimed, “International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
42
upon it are duly presented for their determination.” The practice
of courts, however, has diverged significantly from this fairly monist
conception.
Notwithstanding the status of treaty law as “supreme Law of the
Land,” it is rarely applied in U.S. courts. One reason for this is that
the courts have developed a doctrine of self-execution, whereby a
treaty is to be regarded as “equivalent to an act of the legislature”
only when “it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
43
provision.”
Such a self-executing treaty would not require any
additional legislative act to render it applicable as part of U.S. law.
However, “when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
44
before it can become a rule for the Court.”
This doctrine of self-execution has been invoked to deny
domestic legal effect to numerous treaties, in particular those of a
45
human rights or humanitarian character.
This doctrine would
also likely bar application of the ICCPR in U.S. courts. When
expressing its consent to be bound by the ICCPR, the U.S.
government made a declaration to the effect that “the provisions of
46
Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”
Even when a treaty provision is not self-executing, however,
this does not mean that it is legally irrelevant to litigation in U.S.
courts. According to the “Charming Betsy” rule, “an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations

42. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
43. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing how the Geneva Convention of 1949 did not give enemy combatants
any judicially enforceable rights).
46. 138 CONG. REC. 6, 8071 (1992). At the same time this declaration was
made, the U.S. government also noted its understanding that “distinctions based
upon race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or any other status—as those terms are used in Article
2, paragraph 1 and Article 26—[are] permitted when such distinctions are, at
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Id.
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47

if any other possible construction remains.” While its terms limit
the rule’s application to construction of federal statutory law, an
argument could be made that it should apply to the interpretation
48
of U.S. law as a whole, including the Constitution.
The status of customary international law as comprising part of
U.S. law was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Sosa v.
49
Alvarez-Machain, a case involving application of the Alien Tort
50
Statute (ATS). Writing for the majority, Justice Souter recalled
that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of
47. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1808).
48. The rule has traditionally been applied as a canon of statutory
construction ascribing to Congress a presumed intent to legislate consistent with
the international obligations of the United States. E.g., Maria v. McElroy, 68 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). This traditional formulation of the rule would
preclude application in a case such as Lawrence for several reasons. First, the rule
is applied to avoid potential conflicts between international law and U.S. law. The
constitutional provisions relevant to the Lawrence case do not conflict with
international law. The fact that those constitutional provisions have not been
interpreted as broadly as the protections provided by the ICCPR does not of itself
create a conflict. The legal provision in Lawrence that is in conflict with the ICCPR
is a state statute. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003), declared
unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). As that statute
expressly conflicts with the ICCPR, there is no construction that would harmonize
the two. See supra Part I. Second, if the rule is understood as creating a
presumption regarding legislative intent, it would seem inapplicable to
international obligations arising after the relevant domestic law was adopted. One
cannot argue that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend to fall afoul of an
international obligation that would not arise until almost two centuries later.
Nonetheless, strong arguments support the application of the rule in
cases such as Lawrence, even though this would involve a conception of the rule
that takes it beyond these traditional parameters. First, in order for the rule to be
applied sensibly, it must acknowledge that the provisions of domestic law do not
exist in isolation from each other. Together they form a legal system generated
and subsisting within a broader constitutional framework. Viewed in this context,
the rule is most naturally and most coherently applied to U.S. law as a whole.
Thus, a more coherent understanding of the rule would hold that U.S. law should
not be construed to violate international law if any other possible construction
remains. Second, there is no reason why the rule should be limited to a
presumption regarding congressional intent. Indeed its original formulation in
Murray does not confine its application to the realm of intent. Even if it remains
confined to presumed intent, it could well be argued that this intent should apply
prospectively to encompass later-in-time international obligations, particularly in
light of the prospective nature of a constitutional instrument. Thus, it may be
presumed that the founders intended that the United States comply with its
international obligations and that the Constitution was drafted accordingly.
49. 542 U.S. 692, 712-24 (2004).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The ATS of course may not be invoked by U.S.
citizens. Sosa is referred to here simply to illustrate the disposition of U.S. courts
toward the reception of international human rights law generally.
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the United States recognizes the law of nations,” citing, among
51
other cases, The Paquete Habana. The Court expressly recognized
this to be the case with respect to international norms “intended to
52
protect individuals.” At the same time, however, the Court set a
fairly high bar for recognizing new causes of action derived from
international law and actionable on the basis of the ATCA’s
jurisdictional grant, and cited numerous reasons why federal courts
53
should be hesitant to do so. This corresponds with the general
reluctance among U.S. courts to apply international law, as the
54
courts themselves have noted.
The reasons for this reluctance are many and, in part, selfperpetuating. One reason is simply that U.S. law schools do not
regard international law as central to legal education and, as a
result, most American lawyers have no exposure to international
55
law. Thus, the bar is unable to educate the judiciary on the extent
to which international law forms part of the applicable law in any
56
And the perceived reluctance of U.S. courts to
given case.
consider international law is logically a factor in the relegation of
international law classes to the periphery in American legal
education.
Some have speculated that the increasing dualistic tendencies
of the U.S. legal system correspond to its increasing hegemonic
status. The originally more monist framework of a young United
States was developed at a time when the United States were new
subjects of international law, a time when the norms of
51. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
52. Id. at 730. Further, in finding customary international law to have the
status of federal common law, the Court brought customary law within the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“The Court’s approach places the law of nations on a federal-law footing
unknown to the First Congress. At the time of the ATS’s enactment, the law of
nations, being part of general common law, was not supreme federal law that could
displace state law. By contrast, a judicially created federal rule based on
international norms would be supreme federal law.”) (citation omitted).
53. See id. at 732-38.
54. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In particular,
American courts have often been reluctant to apply customary international law,
in spite of binding Supreme Court precedent.”).
55. See Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal
Education and the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 815, 824-26 (2002)
(noting international law’s relative unimportance in contemporary legal
education).
56. Indeed, the Petitioners in Lawrence made no reference to international
law in their Supreme Court brief. See Brief for Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152352.
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international law dovetailed well with the short and longer time
interests of the fledgling republic. However, a strong international
legal order may be perceived to bring fewer advantages as states
become more powerful. That the rule of law as applied to the king
is in the king’s interest is not readily apparent, particularly when
the king’s election cycles are of relatively short duration.
Another significant factor is the tendency of U.S. courts to
conflate international law with foreign law. For Justice Scalia, the
distinction between these two types of law is not particularly
meaningful in cases before U.S. courts. In his Sosa dissent, he
remarked,
[w]e Americans have a method for making the laws that
are over us. We elect representatives to two Houses of
Congress, each of which must enact the new law and
present it for the approval of a President, whom we also
elect. For over two decades now, unelected federal judges
have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting
what they regard as norms of international law into
57
American law . . . .
For Scalia, there is no legally relevant distinction between foreign
58
law and customary international law since neither has been
59
adopted as U.S. law through the normal U.S. legislative process.
Nonetheless, the legal distinction between these two types of
law is clear. While international law binds the United States,
foreign law does not. While customary law is applicable as part of
U.S. law, foreign law is not.
That is not to say, however, that the practice of other states
may not still be of relevance to cases being adjudicated in U.S.
courts. As noted above, courts may have recourse to foreign law in
undertaking a comparative law analysis. This type of analysis could

57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See id. (“The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the
proposition that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the
death penalty could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of
foreigners.”) (citation omitted).
59. See id. (discussing the election of representatives and how the Congress
and president create U.S. law). This is compounded by Scalia’s perception of
international human rights law in particular as something of a lesser species of
international law. “The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the
consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a
sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century
invention of internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates.” Id. at
749-50.
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be employed to aid in interpreting a provision in a treaty to which
the United States are also a party, or even to interpret analogous
provisions in domestic law.
Reference to foreign law could also be made in the context of
determining whether there exists a relevant norm of customary
international law, the practice of states being one element in the
establishment of customary norms. In this context, what is being
determined is a binding norm. However, it would not be the
foreign law that would form part of the applicable law. It would be
the customary norm that was evidenced in part by the practice of
foreign states.
As noted above, the Lawrence Court invoked the case law of the
60
ECHR in modest terms. In so doing, it essentially reduced the
Court’s jurisprudence to mere foreign practice—in the words of
Justice Scalia, “meaningless dicta.” By failing to tie that practice
back to international obligations binding on the United States, for
example, by invoking the ICCPR, the majority in a sense bolstered
the legitimacy of Justice Scalia’s dissent.
But to qualify that dicta as “meaningless” may be an
61
overstatement. And to qualify it as “dangerous” simply begs the
question: dangerous to whom?
As noted in the introduction, another factor is the perception
that the U.S. legal system is superior to the international legal
system.
Thus, where their spheres of regulation overlap,
international law should be ignored. This would apply a fortiori in
62
the sphere of constitutional rights.
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
61. The U.S. Supreme Court has evinced a willingness to refer to legal
developments beyond American borders in a number of recent cases. In Roper v.
Simmons, for example, the majority referred to both foreign and international law
in surmising that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling
our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.” 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005). Similarly, in her dissent in that case,
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that “this Nation’s evolving understanding of
human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds
with, the values prevailing in other countries,” and that “the existence of an
international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a
consonant and genuine American consensus.” Id. at 1215-16 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). While these references invoke international authority in the most
feeble of terms, they at least indicate a renewed openness toward such authority.
62. It must be recalled, however, that international human rights law sets a
minimum standard of protection; it would not require a State to eliminate or
reduce any greater protection of individual rights that may be afforded under its
domestic law.
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In contrast to the world of 1948, the year when the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, many more countries today have legally
entrenched rights comparable to those afforded by the U.S.
Constitution. In light of this fact and in the context of increasing
security measures adopted by the U.S. government, it may be
argued that there has been a relative erosion in the degree to
which human rights protection in the United States exceeds that of
other states. Indeed, it may be that those within the power of the
United States, and especially those who may not be entitled to the
full protection of the U.S. Constitution, are now in greater need of
international legal protection of their rights. From the perspective
of these individuals, greater recourse to international legal
standards by U.S. courts would be anything but dangerous.
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